Intentions and Trolleys
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10691975 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Joseph Shaw (Saint Joseph Seminary College, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2006 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Fascículo | 222 |
| Páginas | 63-83 |
| Data de publicação | 2006-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00429.x |
| OpenAlex | W2137591160 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 4 |
| Referências citadas | 10 |
The series of ‘trolley’ examples issue a challenge to moral principles based on intentions, since it seems that these give the wrong answers in two important cases: ‘Fat Man’, where they seem to say that it is permissible to push someone in front of a trolley to save others, and ‘Loop’, where they seem to say that it is wrong to divert a trolley towards a single person whose body will stop it and save others. I reply, first, that there is a parallel between the wrongful intention to mutilate in ‘Transplant’, where one person's vital organs are removed to save others' lives, and the intention to assault in Fat Man. Secondly, I defend Frances Kamm's view that in Loop one can divert the trolley towards the one without an intention to kill or assault, since good potential side‐effects can be taken into account in deciding what to do, without their becoming intentions
Accident (philosophy) · Epistemology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,25 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2010 - 2022 (13) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 4 |