Contextualism, Hawthorne's Invariantism and Third-Person Cases
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10692313 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Anthony Brueckner (University of California, Santa Barbara, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2005 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Fascículo | 219 |
| Páginas | 315-318 |
| Data de publicação | 2005-04-01 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00400.x |
| OpenAlex | W2172153361 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 3 |
Keith DeRose discusses ‘third‐person cases’, which appear to raise problems for John Hawthorne's invariantist approach to knowledge‐attributions. I argue that there is a prima facie problem for invariantism stemming from third‐person cases that is even worse than DeRose's. Then I show that in the end, contrary to appearances, third‐person cases do not threaten invariantism
Attribution · Contextualism · Epistemology · First person · Linguistics · Prima facie · Third party · Third person · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citações por ano | 0,17 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 2008 - 2023 (16) |
| Altamente citado | Não |