Putnam's Traditional Neo-Essentialism
Putnam's Traditional Neo-essentialism
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10692334 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Neil E Williams, Neil Williams (0000-0002-6139-677X, University at Buffalo, State University of New York, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2011 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Fascículo | 242 |
| Páginas | 151-170 |
| Data de publicação | 2011-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.667.x |
| OpenAlex | W1776806096 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 5 |
Recently, several philosophers have defended what might be called ‘neo‐essentialism’ about natural kinds. Their views purport to improve upon the traditional essentialism of Kripke and Putnam by rejecting the claim that essences must be comprised of intrinsic properties. I argue that this so‐called break from traditional essentialism is not a break at all, because the widespread interpretation of Putnam according to which he takes essences to be intrinsic is mistaken. Putnam makes no claim to the effect that essences of natural kinds must be intrinsic, and offers at least one example of a natural kind whose essence is non‐intrinsic. I conclude that his traditional essentialism has been misinterpreted, and consequently that neo‐essentialism is not so ‘neo’ after all
Epistemology · Essentialism · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Natural (archaeology) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Obras citantes distintas | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,45 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2015 - 2024 (10) |
| Velocidade de citação | recent |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 5 |