Subject Sensitive Invariantism

Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than subject sensitive invariantism is. © 2007 The Author

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  Open Access•Juan S Piñeros Glasscock•Pacific philosophical quarterly•2022

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• Knowledge across Contexts. A Problem for Subject-Sensitive Invariantism

  Open Access•Peter Baumann•Dialogue•2016

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• Solving the Skeptical Problem

  Keith Derose•The Philosophical Review•1995

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• Memory as a Generative Epistemic Source

  Open Access•Jennifer Lackey•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2005

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• Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination

  Open Access•Jonathan Schaffer•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2004

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• Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions

  Keith Derose•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•1992

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