Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10692670
AutoresEdwin Curley (autor correspondente), E M Curley
Ano1984
Volume93
Fascículo4
Páginas569
Data de publicação1984-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2184828
OpenAlexW2318511025
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas23

Subsequently Descartes explains that the eternal truths-what we would call necessary truths-depend on God's will, that since God's will was free, he could have created a world in which these truths did not hold, just as he could have not created any world at all.2 So, for example, God was free to create a world in which the lines from the center of a circle to its circumference were not all equal. We cannot comprehend this possibility, but that is because our intellects are finite, whereas God's power is infinite and incomprehensible. Clearly this is a bizarre doctrine. But how bizarre is it? What exactly is Descartes committed to by this doctrine? Why does he hold it? What is the best that can be said in defense of it? Those are the questions I hope to answer in this paper. But before I proceed to say what I think Descartes is committed to by this doctrine, let me say what I think he is not committed to

Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy · Theology and Philosophy of Evil