The Doctrine of Doing and Allowing

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10693297
AutoresSamuel C Rickle (0000-0002-8421-0982, autor correspondente), Samuel C Rickless
Ano1997
Volume106
Fascículo4
Páginas555
Data de publicação1997-10-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2998512
OpenAlexW2328049105
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas9

There is a long-standing disagreement over whether to accept consequentialism, the view that the morality of an action or omission depends solely on its consequences. In defense of nonconsequentialism, some moral theorists appeal to the widely shared intuition that there is a morally significant difference between doing harm and merely allowing it to occur. According to these theorists, there are cases in which the morality of a given action or omission depends not only on its consequences but also on whether the agent does harm or merely allows it to occur. The thesis that there is such a distinction has come to be known as the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing (DDA).' The various proponents of the DDA differ over how it should be understood. It might be thought that the distinction between doing and allowing reduces to the distinction between action and inaction. As against this, Philippa Foot has argued that some actions, such as pulling the plug on an artificial respirator, should be treated as allowings. On her view, the relevant distinction is primarily one between (i) initiating or sustaining a harmful causal sequence, and (ii) allowing or enabling a harmful causal sequence to run its course.' The view that this is the proper interpretation

Contemporary philosophy · Doctrine · Epistemology · General interest · Theology · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification