"Doubts About "Descartes' Self-Doubt

In a recent article, Donald Sievert advances a new and interesting interpretation of the cogito.1 Supposedly, this interpretation enjoys an advantage over all others that it explains how Descartes could have expressed both doubt and certainty regarding his own existence without falling victim to self-contradiction. In briefest outline, the view Sievert would have us adopt is this: First, Descartes is said to observe occurrent mental acts (S, 55).2 When these observations take place, Descartes . . does not and cannot imagine doubting, the existence of what he observes. . . . (S, 58). That is to say, when Descartes mental acts, he has knowledge of (S, 51), or is certain of (S, 57), the existence of such acts. Further, particular thoughts or mental acts cannot be conceived of by Descartes as existing apart from a thinking substance (S, 55) or self (S, 51, note 1). Thus, whenever Descartes a mental act, he must conclude that there is an existent thinking substance or self which that act resides (S, 55). Still, because this conclusion rests upon an inference or judgment, and reasoning of this sort carries with it the risk of doubt, Descartes cannot know that he exists as a thinking substance until a veracious God has been proven to exist (S, 51, 55, 58). However, if Descartes considers himself only in terms of the acts which he observes (that is, if he takes himself to be the mental acts which are observed), he can know that he exists, for it is impossible to doubt the existence of observed mental acts (S, 55-56). I believe that Sievert is correct when he insists that Descartes expresses both doubt and certainty concerning his own existence.3 I also believe that Sievert is pursuing a proper course when he tries to explain this vacillation Descartes' thought. However, I do not think that Sievert's interpretation of the cogito is correct; and what follows I am going to argue that his analysis must be rejected because it

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