Radical Externalism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10693780
AutoresAmia Srinivasan (University of Oxford, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume129
Fascículo3
Páginas395-431
Data de publicação2020-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-8311261
OpenAlexW4244620105
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas23
Referências citadas42

This article presents a novel challenge to epistemic internalism. The challenge rests on a set of cases which feature subjects forming beliefs under conditions of “bad ideology”—that is, conditions in which pervasively false beliefs have the function of sustaining, and are sustained by, systems of social oppression. In such cases, the article suggests, the externalistic view that justification is in part a matter of worldly relations, rather than the internalistic view that justification is solely a matter of how things stand from the agent’s individual perspective, becomes the more intuitively attractive theory. But these “bad ideology” cases do not merely yield intuitive verdicts that favor externalism over internalism. These cases are, moreover, analogous to precisely those canonical cases widely taken to be counterexamples to externalism: cases featuring brains-in-vats, clairvoyants, and dogmatists. That is, such “bad ideology” cases are, in all relevant respects, just like cases that are thought to count against externalism—except that they intuitively favor externalism. This, the author argues, is a serious worry for internalism. What is more, it bears on the debate over whether externalism is a genuinely “normative” epistemology

Counterexample · Epistemology · Externalism · Ideology · Internalism and externalism · Normative · Political science · Politics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics