The Trivializability of Universalizability

A NALYTIC ethics can easily be a frustrating business. We , would like very much to arrive at substantial ethical conclusions, but these seem to be ruled out by the very nature of the subject. So it is not surprising that some hope, by reflecting on the essential nature of moral judgment, moral praise and blame, to arrive at formal principles which, while not embodying any particular moral content, nevertheless have some practical bearing on moral argument and moral opinion. One such principle would seem to be the principle that we must-logically must, must if we are to be judging morally in the first place-treat like cases alike. The only trouble is that as soon as any weight is put on this principle it seems to collapse into the shattering triviality that cases are alike, morally or in any other respect, unless they are different. In this paper I want to argue that Professor R. M. Hare's recent ingenious attempt to put forward a thesis of universalizability (in Freedom and Reason [Oxford, i963], abbreviated to FR) suffers precisely this fate

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · War, Ethics, and Justification

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  Open Access•Nakul Krishna•Royal Institute of Philosophy…•2020

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