Truth and Freedom

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10695721
AutoresTrenton Merricks (autor correspondente)
Ano2009
Volume118
Fascículo1
Páginas29-57
Data de publicação2009-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-2008-028
OpenAlexW2117619214
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas21
Referências citadas23

Suppose that time t is just a few moments from now. And suppose that the proposition that Jones sits at t was true a thousand years ago. Does the thousand-years-ago truth of that proposition imply that Jones's upcoming sitting at t will not be free? This article argues that it does not. It also argues that Jones even now has a choice about the thousand-years-ago truth of that Jones sits at t. Those arguments do not require the complex machinery of Ockhamism, with its distinction between hard facts and soft facts; indeed, those arguments do not require any complex machinery at all. Instead, those arguments are built on an uncontroversial understanding of the idea that truth depends on the world. In the final section of the article, those arguments are extended to show that foreknowledge of an action does not threaten that action's freedom

Action (physics) · Epistemology · Foreknowledge · Physics · Proposition · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science