Putnam's Argument Against Realism
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10695794 |
|---|---|
| Autores | John Koethe (autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1979 |
| Volume | 88 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 92 |
| Data de publicação | 1979-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editora | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184780 |
| OpenAlex | W2315928823 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 7 |
IN Realism and Reason' Hilary Putnam attempts to show that certain picture the relation of any correct theory to all or part of is incoherent. According to this picture, which he dubs metaphysical realism, there is a determinate relation of reference between terms in [any language L] and pieces (or sets of pieces) of WORLD, 2 in terms of which truth for L is to be defined. Moreover, THE WORLD is supposed to be independent of any particular representation [or theory] we have of it-indeed, it is held that we might be unable to represent WORLD at all
Analytic philosophy · Argument (complex analysis) · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Realism · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Obras citantes distintas | 7 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,15 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1980 - 1996 (17) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 7 |