On Truth-Conditions for If (but Not Quite Only If )

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10695855
AutoresAnthony S Gillies (0000-0003-2978-223X, autor correspondente)
Ano2009
Volume118
Fascículo3
Páginas325-349
Data de publicação2009-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-2009-002
OpenAlexW2133097693
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas30
Referências citadas10

What we want to be true about ordinary indicative conditionals seems to be more than we can possibly get: there just seems to be no good way to assign truth-conditions to ordinary indicative conditionals. Some take this argument as reason to make our wantings more modest. Others take it to show that indicative conditionals don't have truth-conditions in the first place. But we have overlooked two possibilities for assigning truth-conditions to indicatives. What's more, those possibilities deliver what we want and turn out to be equivalent

Alethiology · Argument (complex analysis) · Coherence theory of truth · Epistemology · Linguistics · Pragmatic theory of truth · Truth value · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science