Psychologism and Behaviorism
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 10695878 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Ned Block (0000-0003-0587-6899, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1981 |
| Volume | 90 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Páginas | 5 |
| Data de publicação | 1981-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Philosophical Review (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470 |
| Editora | JSTOR (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2184371 |
| OpenAlex | W2330954386 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 84 |
This paper makes two claims: first, psychologism is true, and thus a natural behaviorist analysis of intelligence that is incompatible with psychologism is false. Second, the standard arguments against behaviorism are inadequate to defeat this natural behaviorist analysis of intelligence or to establish psychologism. While psychologism is of course anathema to behaviorists, it also seems wrong-headed to many philosophers who would not classify themselves as behaviorists. For example, Michael Dummett says: If a Martian could learn to speak a human language, or a robot be devised to behave in just the ways that are essential to a language speaker, an implicit knowledge of the correct theory of meaning for the language could be attributed to the Martian or the robot with as much right as to a human speaker, even though their internal mechanisms were entirely different. (Dummett, 1976) Dummett's view seems to be that what is relevant to the possession of a certain mental state is a matter of actual and potential behavior, and that internal processing is not relevant except to the extent that internal processing affects actual and potential behavior. I think that this Dummettian claim contains an important grain of truth, a grain that many philosophers wrongly take to be incompatible with psychologism. This grain of truth can be elucidated as follows. Suppose we meet Martians, and find them to be behaviorally indistinguishable from humans. We learn their languages and they learn ours, and we develop deep commercial and cultural relations with them. We contribute to their journals and enjoy their movies, and vice versa. Then Martian and human psychologists compare notes, only to find that in underlying psychological mechanisms the Martians are very different from us. The M
Analytic philosophy · Behaviorism · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Psychoanalysis · Psychologism · Computability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Philosophy · Psychology
Thinking Machines
Is Experiencing Just Representing
Climbing towards NLU
Perspectives on Digital Humanism
Language, Brain, and Cognitive Development
Minds, brains, and programs
Ignorance and Imagination
From Metaphysics to Ethics
Postscript
Social Theory
For Holism, Against Atomism
For Individualism, Against Collectivism
Thought
Political Theory
Intentionality
Philosophy of Mind
Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950)
Efficient Cognition
Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology
Mental Paint and Mental Latex
Chatbot learning partners
What Are Degrees of Belief?
Thought Experiments and Possibilities
Does mind perception explain the uncanny valley? A meta-regression analysis and (de)humanization experiment
The Common Mind
The turing test and the interface problem
Superinteligence a problém kontroly
Similarities and differences of duplicity in english and vietnamese
People Evaluate Agents Based on the Algorithms That Drive Their Behavior
An Analysis of Turing’s Criterion for ‘Thinking’
Not All Computational Methods Are Effective Methods
Turing’s Conceptual Engineering
Art Notions in the Age of (Mis)anthropic AI
The Philosophy of Language Models
Phenomenology-first versus third-person approaches in the science of consciousness
For a contextualist and content-related understanding of the difference between human and artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence and African conceptions of personhood
Beginning at the beginning
(Still) defending mental fictionalism
Defending mental fictionalism
Mind as quasi-miracle
Animal consciousness and phenomenal concepts
Turing’s Philosophy of AI
Intelligent Behaviour
Nativism and empiricism in artificial intelligence
Mechanistic indicators of understanding in large language models
Real sparks of artificial intelligence and the importance of inner interpretability
LLMs, Turing tests and Chinese rooms
How to deal with risks of AI suffering
Really Real Patterns
First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument
Refuting the unfolding-argument on the irrelevance of causal structure to consciousness
Simulating conversations
Can machines have emotions
When Minds Converse
What Do Large Language Models Know? Tacit Knowledge as a Potential Causal-Explanatory Structure
Morgan's Canon Revisited
The Metaphysical Implications of the Moral Significance of Consciousness
Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism
Intelligence as a Social Concept
Can We Have Moral Status for Robots on the Cheap
From Combination to Individuation
Moral Testimony Pessimism and the Uncertain Value of Authenticity
Christopher Winch on the Representational Theory of Language and its Pedagogic Relevance
L’intelligence par-delà l’anthropocentrisme
A plank across the explanatory gap
Physicalism, Supervenience, and Dependence
Research on the moral status of social robots based on relational continuity
Is AI intelligent? An assessment of artificial intelligence, 70 years after Turing
Psychologism reconsidered
Intuition, intelligence, data compression
Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton
How physicalists can avoid reductionism
Descartes’ influence on Turing
Prospects for the Cyberiad
A Simple Comment Regarding the Turing Test
On the captivity of the will
A Simplicity Criterion for Physical Computation
Black Boxes or Unflattering Mirrors? Comparative Bias in the Science of Machine Behaviour
The Turing test is not a good benchmark for thought in LLMs
Human bias in algorithm design
Is Distributed Cognition Group Level Cognition
Why not a Sociology of Machines? The Case of Sociology and Artificial Intelligence
| Obras citantes distintas | 84 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,83 |
| Intervalo de citações | 1980 - 2026 (47) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 82 |