The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10696637
AutoresGila Sher (0000-0002-2395-9228, autor correspondente)
Ano2001
Volume110
Fascículo2
Páginas241-261
Data de publicação2001-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-110-2-241
OpenAlexW2129665912
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas12

In a recent paper, 'The Concept of Logical Consequence," W. H. Hanson (1997) criticizes a fml-strmctural characterization of logical consequence in Tarski (1966) and Sher (1991Sher ( ,1996a) ) .'Hanson accepts many principles of the formal-structural view.Relating to Sher 1991 and 1996a, he says: Sher's fundamental principles are sound.She holds that in deciding how the logical consequence relation shall be delineated we must take into account both theoretical and practical matters, and she suggests that to do so properly it is crucial to be clear about the role logic is expected to play (1991,7,36).I agree completely, and I have tried to use these broad principles to guide the present inquiry.She also sees herself as working squarely in the semantic tradition begun by Tarski, she wholeheartedly approves of his insistence that logical consequence be both a necessary and formal relation, and she accepts his characterization of formality as freedom from influence by empirical knowledge.Again I concur with her general approach.(Hanson 1997, 392-93) But, according to Hanson, there is a flaw in the formal-structural view: it is neutral with regard to the apriority of logic.This neutrality

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