The Possibility of Absent Qualia

I Q ydney Shoemaker has defended functionalism against the ab3sent qualia objection.' The purpose of the present paper is to vindicate that objection by refuting Shoemaker's case against it. Shoemaker's principal argument against the possibility of absent qualia goes like this: The qualitative character of pain is known. Thus, one of the causal properties of pain must be to produce beliefs about its qualitative character in a way that gives the beliefs knowledge-level justification. If there could be some characterless state that replicated the whole functional role of pain in our mental lives, then this ersatz pain state would produce the same beliefs about qualitative character, and they would have the same justification. On this assumption, we have no evidence that distinguishes genuine pains from such ersatz pain states. This is incompatible with the fact that we know the qualitative character of pain, because distinguishing evidence is required for knowledge. Hence, a characterless functional replica of pain is not really possible. Any state having the functional role of pain must also have qualitative character. It is best not to evaluate Shoemaker's argument in this rough form. It is vital to determine what it is legitimate here to include within the functional role of pain. Furthermore, the argument is only part of Shoemaker's case against the absent qualia objection to functionalism. He believes that this argument is jeopardized by the apparent possibility that the reference of mental state terms has been fixed in a parochial way. Shoemaker uses new considerations to dispute that possibility. Finally Shoemaker uses the new considerations to support a second argument against absent qualia, one that bypasses the epistemic premises of the first argument

Consciousness · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Qualia · Free Will and Agency · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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  David J Chalmers•Consciousness•2003

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