Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10698840
AutoresAndrew Bacon (University of Southern California, autor correspondente)
Ano2015
Volume124
Fascículo3
Páginas299-352
Data de publicação2015-07-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
EditoraDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-2895327
OpenAlexW2191267443
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas10
Referências citadas45

Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centered around what this essay calls “linguistic” accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or nonparadoxical status. “No proposition” views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. This essay shows that linguistic accounts of the paradoxes endorsing classical logic are subject to a particularly acute form of the revenge paradox: that there is no exhaustive classification of sentences into “good” and “bad” such that the T-schema holds when restricted to the “good” sentences unless it is also possible to prove some “bad” sentences. The foundations for an alternative classical nonlinguistic approach is outlined that is not subject to the same kinds of problems. Although revenge paradoxes of different strengths can be formulated, they are found to be indeterminate at higher orders and not inconsistent

Epistemology · Linguistics · Property (philosophy) · Proposition · Schema (genetic algorithms) · Subject (documents) · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science