Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke

L ocke's concept of persons in his discussion of personal identity has received a great deal of critical attention. But the chapter on identity was added to the Essay in the Second Edition; it appears to be a digression and an afterthought.1 Locke scholars have generally thought it futile to attempt to make any interesting connections between his concept of persons and the broader epistemological themes of the Essay. Eric Matthews, for example, explicitly denies such connections with his statement that Locke's

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · General interest · Sociology · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Philosophy

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