The Percept and Vector Function Theories of the Brain

Physicalism is an empirical theory of the mind and its place in nature. So the physicalist must show that current neuroscience does not falsify physicalism, but instead supports it. Current neuroscience shows that a nervous system is what I call a vector function system. I provide a brief outline of the resources that empirical research has made available within the constraints of the vector function approach. Then I argue that these resources are sufficient, indeed apt, for the physicalist enterprise, by offering a vector functional, hence physicalist, theory of the percept —the perceptual experience itself, a paradigm of phenomenally immediate, introspectively accessible consciousness

Biology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Metaphysics · Percept · Perception · Physicalism · Computer Science · Neural dynamics and brain function · Neural Networks and Applications · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology

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