A defence of the austere view of nonsense

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10811564
AutoresKrystian Bogucki (0000-0002-4753-497X, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume201
Fascículo5
Data de publicação2023-04-20
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-023-04138-x
OpenAlexW4366548611
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas59

The austere view of nonsense says that the source of nonsense is not a violation of the rules of logical syntax, but nonsense is always due to a lack of meaning in one of the components of a sentence. In other words, the necessary and sufficient condition for nonsensicality is that no meaning has been assigned to a constituent in a sentence. The austere conception is the key ingredient of the resolute reading of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that presents a therapeutical interpretation of the work, and rejects a possibility of conveying some ineffable truths by means of nonsensical sentences. In this paper, I defend the austere view against the most important objections. Firstly, I discuss textual sources for ascribing to Wittgenstein the austere view that have not been sufficiently thoroughly discussed yet. Next, I indicate that the apparent occurrence of words out of the context of a sentence on lists of verbs and in definitions is not in conflict with the version of the context principle recommended by austere theorists, since this argument does not sufficiently take into account the distinction between sign and symbol. Furthermore, I argue that the austere conception and the principle of compositionality are jointly tenable, for the former view does not exclude the existence of syntactic and semantic rules, but only shows that they are recognizable conditionally. Finally, I indicate that the austere view of nonsense should be seen as a viable option by a contemporary theorist of nonsense, for it helps us to avoid making controversial assumptions about the nature of meaning and content

Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Metaphysics · Nonsense · Philosophy of language · Sentence · Syntax · History · Logic, programming, and type systems · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications