Belief in truthmaker semantics

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10813645
AutoresMark Jago (0000-0001-7283-8556, University of Nottingham, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume204
Fascículo4
Data de publicação2024-09-25
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-024-04748-z
OpenAlexW4402852521
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas28

Stephen Yablo has argued that ascriptions of belief and knowledge are sensitive to subject matter and that theorising in such terms may help resolve philosophical questions about the semantics of such ascriptions. Truthmaker semantics offers a way of theorising about subject matters. My main aim in this paper is to investigate what a semantics for knowledge or belief ascriptions might look like within truthmaker semantics. I then discuss what the resulting account might have to say about the problem of logical omniscience, the nature of concepts, and rational belief

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Programming language · Semantics (computer science) · Computer Science · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation · Philosophy · Semantic Web and Ontologies