Armchair philosophy naturalized

Dados Bibliográficos

ID10814331
AutoresSebastian Lutz (0000-0003-4274-4174, Uppsala University, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume197
Fascículo3
Páginas1099-1125
Data de publicação2020-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoSynthese (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0039-7857 • E-ISSN: 1573-0964
EditoraSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11229-017-1653-z
OpenAlexW2758908584
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas38

Carnap suggests that philosophy can be construed as being engaged solely in conceptual engineering. I argue that since many results of the sciences can be construed as stemming from conceptual engineering as well, Carnap’s account of philosophy can be methodologically naturalistic. This is also how he conceived of his account. That the sciences can be construed as relying heavily on conceptual engineering is supported by empirical investigations into scientific methodology, but also by a number of conceptual considerations. I present a new conceptual consideration that generalizes Carnap’s conditions of adequacy for analytic–synthetic distinctions and thus widens the realm in which conceptual engineering can be used to choose analytic sentences. I apply these generalized conditions of adequacy to a recent analysis of scientific theories and defend the relevance of the analytic–synthetic distinction against criticisms by Quine, Demopoulos, and Papineau

Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Quine · Realm · Relevance (law) · Scientific theory · Sociology · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History