The War in Ukraine

The Deterrent Effect of Weaponized Interdependence

Dados Bibliográficos

ID11047236
AutoresTatsiana Kulakevich (0000-0002-8435-6703, University of South Florida, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Páginas1-13
Data de publicação2024-10-31
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoNationalities Papers (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0090-5992 • E-ISSN: 1465-3923
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/nps.2024.75
OpenAlexW4403948296
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas15

This article examines Putin’s expectations prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and seeks to answer the following question: Why did Russia invade Ukraine regardless of the West’s threats of severe economic penalties raising the cost of an attack? I argue that the confidence in Vladimir Putin to invade Ukraine, despite his awareness that the stakes could go well beyond the borders of Ukraine and increase the cost of war for the Kremlin, was based on Putin’s calculations that the West would be reluctant to change or substantially displace established rich-get-richer economic structures and would not apply high costs on the Kremlin for military aggression against Ukraine in case of a successful blitzkrieg campaign. By utilizing an extended deterrence game analysis, the article demonstrates how Russia, Ukraine, and the West interacted in decision-making, taking into account the reactions and choices of the other players, and adds to the current body of knowledge by introducing an expanded approach to deterrence strategy based on economic interdependence and the scale of the anticipated conflict

Economics · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics