The covert campaign against Iran’s nuclear program

Implications for the theory and practice of counterproliferation

Dados Bibliográficos

ID11158992
AutoresRichard Maher (0000-0002-3391-7224, University College Dublin, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume44
Fascículo7
Páginas1014-1040
Data de publicação2021-11-10
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Strategic Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0140-2390 • E-ISSN: 1743-937X
EditoraInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/01402390.2019.1662401
OpenAlexW2979135780
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas37

This paper examines the covert campaign against Iran’s nuclear program and the implications it holds for both the theory and the practice of counterproliferation. The paper evaluates the degree to which covert action succeeded in producing meaningful delays and disruptions to Iran’s nuclear progress, in enhancing U.S. diplomatic leverage, and in helping to compel Iranian leaders to accept limits and restrictions on their country’s nuclear activities. More broadly, the paper analyzes the merits and viability of covert counterproliferation strategies, including how to define and measure the effectiveness of covert counterproliferation activity and how and under what conditions covert counterproliferation can be effective

Action (physics · Covert · Leverage (statistics · Political science · Public relations · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Nuclear Issues and Defense