Balancing Central Planning with Institutional Autonomy

The personal and institutional damage wrought during the decade of the cultural revolution (I19661976) provided the implicit (and often the explicit) point of departure for virtually all my discussions with Chinese scientists, technicians, managers, and planners-as well as with occasional guides and interpreters. Statistics articulating the chaos that engulfed intellectual life during that decade are now readily available from Chinese sources: The number of college and university students in the country, which had been increasing gradually from approximately 120,000 in 1949 to almost 700,000 in 1965, dropped to less than 50,000 by 1970, as virtually all institutions of higher learning were closed. Scientists and other intellectuals, castigated as members of the bourgeoisie, were dispersed to factories and communes. The central government's planning and coordinating bodies were either downgraded or, as in the case of the State Science and Technology Commission, abolished entirely. The little scientific activity that remained was placed under the jurisdiction of provincial or local authorities. Sufficient time has now elapsed since the downfall in 1976 of the Gang of Four to convince most of those I encountered that China has moved too far beyond the anti-intellectual, xenophobic havoc of the preceding decade to lapse back into comparable chaos. However, the heady optimism that so many foreign visitors reported as the prevailing mood during the two or three years immediately after 1976 was not evident to me. Rather, there now seems to be a more sober recognition of the formidable dimensions of the task of developing modern science and technology capabilities and using them effectively for social and economic development, while at the same time attempting to raise both the living standards and cultural level of a billion people. In short, I encountered a mood of guarded optimism coupled with a strong sense of challenge. China's present leadership has, on several occasions, recognized explicitly the centrality of science and technology to the achievement of its economic and social goals, and appears to be committed to provide both the requisite resources and necessary institutional flexibility. Recognition of the need for greater flexibility than in the years that preceded the cultural revolution-when China's economic planning system was based on a modified Soviet model-is consistent with the leadership's announced approach to economic and social development. Among the reforms that have been introduced into China's economy since 1980, two-reform of the economic management system, and introduction of different economic modes and Dr. Blanpied is Staff Associa te for Iss u es Developm en t in the Office of the Director, National Science Foundation, Washington, DC 20550. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policies of the National Science Foundation

Autonomy · China · People's Republic · Political science · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Law · Public Administration