Aristotle and Alexander on Perceptual Error

Dados Bibliográficos

ID11584664
AutoresMark A Johnstone (Department of Philosophy, McMaster University310A University Hall, 1280 Main Street West, Hamilton, Ontario L8S 4K1Canada, autor correspondente)
Ano2015
Volume60
Fascículo3
Páginas310-338
Data de publicação2015-05-20
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhronesis (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8868 • E-ISSN: 1568-5284
EditoraBrill (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1163/15685284-12341287
OpenAlexW871356160
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas10

Aristotle sometimes claims that (i) the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that (ii) the perception of common perceptibles (e.g. shape, number, movement) is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of (i). I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error offers an understanding of Aristotle that can help us to make good sense of both of Aristotle’s claims

Ancient philosophy · Cognitive psychology · Common sense · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy · Linguistics · Perception · Reading (process · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology