Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle

Dados Bibliográficos

ID11585516
AutoresKrisanna M Scheiter (Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania433 Claudia Cohen Hall, 249 S. 36th Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2012
Volume57
Fascículo3
Páginas251-278
Data de publicação2012-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhronesis (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8868 • E-ISSN: 1568-5284
EditoraBrill (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1163/156852812x641272
OpenAlexW2078337720
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas31
Referências citadas20

Aristotle’s account of phantasia in De Anima 3.3 is notoriously difficult to decipher. At one point he describes phantasia as a capacity for producing images, but then later in the same chapter it is clear phantasia is supposed to explain appearances, such as why the sun appears to be a foot wide. Many commentators argue that images cannot explain appearances, and so they claim that Aristotle is using phantasia in two different ways. In this paper I argue that images actually explain perceptual appearances for Aristotle, and so phantasia always refers to images. I take a new approach to interpreting DA 3.3, reading it alongside Plato’s Theaetetus and Sophist . In the Theaetetus , Socrates explains how memory gives rise to perceptual appearance. I claim that Aristotle adopts Socrates’ account of perceptual appearance, but what Socrates calls memory, Aristotle calls phantasia

Ancient philosophy · Art · Epistemology · Linguistics · Literature · Perception · Reading (process · SOCRATES · Sophist · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Philosophy