Participation, process and policy

The informational value of politicised judicial review

Dados Bibliográficos

ID11635796
AutoresSean Gailmard (0000-0002-1742-5879, University of California System), John W Patty (0000-0002-1142-9334)
Ano2016
Volume37
Fascículo3
Páginas233-260
Data de publicação2016-07-29
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0143-814X • E-ISSN: 1469-7815
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0143814x16000106
OpenAlexW2186360107
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas14
Referências citadas18

We develop a model of “notice and comment” rulemaking, focussing on strategic issues facing agencies and interest groups in light of judicial review in this process. Specifically, we analyse the incentives for agencies and groups to produce and reveal information during rulemaking. We show that judicial review can produce informed policymaking, but that participatory rulemaking can bias agency policymaking in favour of groups with access to the rule-making process. In addition, the model allows an analysis of doctrines of judicial review of agency policymaking. The model reveals that “politicised” judicial review can be beneficial because of its effects on agency incentives for information acquisition in policymaking. Accordingly, socially optimal judicial review may be “legally irrational” and, contrary to standard doctrines of judicial review in the United States, judicial deference to rules with thin records can be optimal

Administrative law · Agency (philosophy · Deference · Economics · Incentive · Judicial deference · Judicial discretion · Judicial opinion · Judicial review · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Notice · Political science · Process (computing · Rulemaking · Sociology · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies