Biopsychism

Life between computation and cognition

Dados Bibliográficos

ID11936639
AutoresFermín C Fulda (0000-0002-4431-5106, University of Toronto, autor correspondente)
Ano2020
Volume45
Fascículo3
Páginas315-330
Data de publicação2020-07-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoInterdisciplinary Science Reviews (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0308-0188 • E-ISSN: 1743-2790
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/03080188.2020.1794381
OpenAlexW3090052616
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas36

The computational metaphor of organisms as phenotypic automata controlled by a genetic programme has been replaced by the cognitive metaphor of organisms as intelligent agents making decisions about how to use their genomic and environmental resources. This metaphor facilitates novel ways of thinking about organisms that defy the assumptions of the old machine metaphor. But like all metaphors, the cognitive metaphor discloses important similarities at the expense of eclipsing significant dissimilarities. I argue that although cognitivism carries with it the crucial insight that living organisms are agents rather than mere automata, this metaphor distorts the nature of biological agency by over-intellectualizing, which risks eliminating the distinction between life and mind. I trace the Cartesian root of these metaphors and argue that it generates a dilemma between mechanism and intellectualism. To capture the middle path that most organisms occupy between these two extremes, I propose an ecological account of natural agency

Algorithm · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Computation · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Neuroscience · Origins and Evolution of Life · Plant and Biological Electrophysiology Studies · Psychology