Safety at nuclear power plants

Economic incentives under the Price-Anderson Act and state regulatory commissions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12006342
AutoresJeffrey A Dubin (California Institute of Technology, autor correspondente), Geoffrey Rothwell (Stanford University), Geoffrey S Rothwell (Stanford University)
Ano1989
Volume26
Fascículo3
Páginas303-311
Data de publicação1989-09-01
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Social Science Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0362-3319 • E-ISSN: 1873-5355
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1016/0362-3319(89)90053-0
OpenAlexW2023564809
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas2

The Price-Anderson Act has indemnified the commercial nuclear power industry since its inception. This article proposes a present value model of firm investment in reactor safety systems to investigate the safety incentives of the 1988 amendments to the Act. While the amendments increase safety incentives for electric utilities through insurance regulation, safety behavior depends crucially on the anticipated reaction of the state regulatory commission after a reactor accident. Notes∗ This research was aided by Paul David and Roger Noll, and was funded by grants from the Exxon Foundation to the Environmental Quality Laboratory at the California Institute of Technology and from the National Science Foundation to the Center for Economic Policy Research, High Technology Impact Program, at Stanford University (IST-8507536). This article reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the Center for Economic Policy Research of Stanford University

Business · Commission · Economics · Foundation (evidence · Incentive · Investment (military · Market economy · Nuclear power · Political science · Public economics · State (computer science · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Public Administration · Finance

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