The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 12228230 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Frances Howard-Snyder, Frances Howard‐Snyder (0000-0003-3148-6069, Western Washington University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 1997 |
| Volume | 9 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Páginas | 241-248 |
| Data de publicação | 1997-07-01 |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Utilitas (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0953-8208 • E-ISSN: 1741-6183 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0953820800005306 |
| OpenAlex | W2125024488 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 41 |
| Referências citadas | 2 |
Objective consequentialism is often criticized because it is impossible to know which of our actions will have the best consequences. Why exactly does this undermine objective consequentialism? I offer a new link between the claim that our knowledge of the future is limited and the rejection of objective consequentialism: that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ and we cannot produce the best consequences available to us. I support this apparently paradoxical contention by way of an analogy. I cannot beat Karpov at chess in spite of the fact that I can make each of many series of moves, at least one of which would beat him. I then respond to a series of objections. In the process I develop an account of the ‘can’ of ability. I conclude with some remarks about the bearing this attack has on subjective consequentialism
Analogy · Consequentialism · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Expertise-Objections to the Argument from Inductive Risk
Informed Altruism and Utilitarianism
Opting for the Best
Rationalist Teleological Maximalism
Rationalist Maximalism
Which, if Either, Are We to Assess Directly in Terms of What Ultimately Matters
What’s the Relevant Sort of Control?
Glossary
Maximalism and the Ought-Most-Reason View
Which Options Have Their Deontic Statuses in Virtue of Their Own Goodness?
What Are Our Options?
Predictability and Convention
Is Rule‐Consequentialism Guilty of Collapse or Incoherence?
What Are the Rules to Promote?
Prohibitions and Special Obligations
Questions of Formulation
Help With Practical Problems
Act‐Consequentialism
Rule‐Consequentialism and Doing Good for the World
I Ought, Therefore I Can
Utilitarianism and our obligations to future people
What virtue ethics can learn from utilitarianism
Taking Utilitarianism Seriously
Utilitarianism and fairness
The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism
Ought-Implies-Can in Context
Common Knowledge
Planning for Mistakes
Ideal Code, Real World
The Probabilistic Nature of Objective Consequentialism
Objectivism and Prospectivism About Rightness
The Oughts and Cans of Objective Consequentialism
Subjective Consequentialism and the Unforeseeable
Clues for Consequentialists
The Rejection of Objective Consequentialism
Action Guidance, Accessibility, and Subjective Permission
Three Feasibility Constraints on the Concept of Justice
Meat Eating and Moral Responsibility
Truth and Acceptance Conditions for Moral Statements Can Be Identical
The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism
Inductive risk and the contexts of communication
| Citações por ano | 1,52 |
|---|---|
| Intervalo de citações | 1999 - 2026 (28) |
| Altamente citado | Não |