Non-constant Returns, Pareto Optimality and Competitive Equilibrium
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 12230294 |
|---|---|
| Autores | David Laibman (autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2001 |
| Volume | 13 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 471-481 |
| Data de publicação | 2001-10-01 |
| Open Access | Não |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Review of Political Economy (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0953-8259 • E-ISSN: 1465-3982 |
| Editora | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09538250120099962 |
| OpenAlex | W2019139759 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 4 |
Competitive equilibrium is not Pareto optimal if returns to scale are not constant, except in special and accidental circumstances. This result is demonstrated using a classical production model; it holds quite generally and independently of all other sources of Pareto inefficiency, such as externalities, imperfect information and quantity constraints. It establishes a general and ubiquitous basis for critique of the 'invisible hand' ideology, which still dominates both the textbooks and wider reaches of social thought
Competitive equilibrium · Constant (computer programming · Econometrics · Economics · Externality · General equilibrium theory · Imperfect competition · Inefficiency · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Pareto principle · Production (economics · Returns to scale · Computer Science · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Institutions
| Altamente citado | Não |
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