The Unitary Executive Theory in Practice

Bureaucratic Structure as an Obstacle to Executive Unilateralism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12419481
AutoresJoseph Karol Natali (0009-0007-9722-4789, Baylor University, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Data de publicação2025-10-18
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPolitical Research Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1065-9129 • E-ISSN: 1938-274X
EditoraSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/10659129251389616
OpenAlexW4415317899
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas69

This paper examines the viability of the controversial “unitary executive theory” (UET) in practice. Additionally, it explores the various ways by which scholars can publicly reason about the potential value of bureaucratic independence. This paper argues that, despite the genuine power that the president wields, bureaucracies remain extremely resilient to the kind of control the UET demands. In particular, the paper shows how bureaucracies are effectively path dependent organizations, the actions of which are constrained by their standard operation procedures, institutional interests, and workplace culture. Even so, because bureaucracies can still enter into equilibriums of power with aggressive executives, this paper argues that scholars must develop means of publicly reasoning about the value of independent bureaucracy that account for the unique aspects of American political culture

European Union Policy and Governance · Political and Economic history of UK and US · Public Policy and Administration Research