Federal transfers, inequality, and redistribution

Contrasting theories and empirical evidence for five Latin American cases

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12576210
AutoresLucas I González (0000-0002-9512-6049, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas, Buenos Aires, Argentina, autor correspondente)
Ano2018
Volume29
Fascículo2
Páginas165-185
Data de publicação2018-08-22
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoRegional & Federal Studies (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1359-7566 • E-ISSN: 1743-9434
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/13597566.2018.1511981
OpenAlexW2888684624
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas4
Referências citadas29

Does federalism encourage inequality? Or, do transfers from the central government augment redistribution? This research examines whether variation in the institutional structures as well as the mechanisms and criteria for the distribution of fiscal resources in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico affect interregional and interpersonal inequality. Using descriptive statistics and regression models for original panel data from these five cases between 1983 and 2013, the study finds that a more progressive redistributive capacity of the central government is statistically associated with improvements in interregional as well as interpersonal equity, challenging the conventional view that federalism reinforces inequality. The article discusses these findings and others from competing arguments, and explores their implications for the discussion on inequality and redistribution in developing nations

Demographic economics · Economics · Empirical evidence · Epistemology · Inequality · Latin Americans · Political science · Politics · Redistribution (election · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Mathematics