When the Will Is Free

Incompatibilists usually direct their attention to the following worry: if the thesis of causal determinism is true, then none of us is free to do other than what he actually does. But although causal determinism poses the most frequently discussed threat to freedom for incompatibilists, it may not be their only source of worry, at least not for those incompatibilists who also accept the common intuition that most of us, most of the time, are free to do otherwise. In his article When Is The Will Free?' Peter van Inwagen offers a creative and systematic development of this less often discussed side of incompatibilism. He maintains (1) that who is an incompatibilist should accept a rule of inference which he calls 'Beta,' and (2) that anyone who accepts Beta should concede that [even if causal determinism is false] one has precious little free will, that if ever, is able to do otherwise than he in fact does (p. 405).2 We will call the position suggested by van Inwagen's arguments 'restrictive incompatibilism' or 'restrictivism' for short. This name seems appropriate because restrictive incompatibilists hold both that incompatibilism is true, and that who accepts the truth of incompatibilism must also (in virtue of accepting Beta) accept radical restrictions on one's ability to do otherwise.3 According to this position, if causal determinism is true, we never are free to do otherwise, and if causal determinism is false, we rarely, if ever are free to do otherwise. The conclusion that all incompatibilistsg allegedly must accept-that we, at best, are only rarely free to do otherwise-will come as a shock to many. However, this conclusion becomes even more disquieting when it is combined with another assumption of the classical tradition which van Inwagen and many other incompatibilists embrace. This is the assumption that freedom to do otherwise is a necessary condition of moral responsibility. Accept this premise and the following worry quickly arises: If the restrictivist is right-if incompatibilists are committed to a severe restriction on one's ability to do otherwise-then must they not also accept a similar limitation on the range of states of affairs for which one can be held morally responsible? And if this

Epistemology · Free Will and Agency · Patient Dignity and Privacy · Philosophy · Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification

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