Manufacturing the Illusion of Epistemic Trustworthiness

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12881663
AutoresTyler Porter (0000-0001-9343-3507, University of Colorado Boulder, autor correspondente)
Ano2024
Volume22
Fascículo2
Páginas576-595
Data de publicação2024-05-02
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoEPISTÉMÈ (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1976-9660 • E-ISSN: 1750-0117
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/epi.2024.14
OpenAlexW4396583077
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas54

There are epistemic manipulators in the world. These people are actively attempting to sacrifice epistemic goods for personal gain. In doing so, manipulators have led many competent epistemic agents into believing contrarian theories that go against well-established knowledge. In this paper, I explore one mechanism by which manipulators get epistemic agents to believe contrarian theories. I do so by looking at a prominent empirical model of trustworthiness. This model identifies three major factors that epistemic agents look for when trying to determine who is trustworthy. These are (i) ability, (ii) benevolence, and (iii) moral integrity. I then show how manipulators can manufacture the illusion that they possess these factors. This leads epistemic agents to view manipulators as trustworthy sources of information. Additionally, I argue that fact-checking will be an ineffective – or even harmful – practice when correcting the beliefs of epistemic agents who have been tricked by this illusion of epistemic trustworthiness. I suggest that in such cases we should use an alternative correction, which I call trust undercutting

Business · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Illusion · Trustworthiness · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Misinformation and Its Impacts · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology