How does the Chinese bureaucracy sustain economic growth without stable local political leaders? Stratified spatial mobility and the role of stable political elites in local governments

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12911178
AutoresZhu Ling (0000-0002-8180-0469, Chinese University of Hong Kong, autor correspondente)
Ano2021
Volume16
Fascículo3
Páginas288-311
Data de publicação2021-12-19
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Asian Public Policy (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1751-6242 • E-ISSN: 1751-6234
EditoraTaylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/17516234.2021.2013400
OpenAlexW4200402810
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas8
Referências citadas43

The economic influence of local political leaders, i.e. heads of local governments and party committees in subnational jurisdictions, has been highly emphasized and widely studied in China. Yet studies have also documented that these leaders experienced frequent spatial transfers and had short time horizons in each jurisdiction, which should have perverse effects on their incentives and capacities to promote the regional economy. What, then, explains the continued economic growth in China without stable local political leaders? Drawing on the stratified spatial mobility model, we emphasize the importance of the more stable political elites, who constitute a crucial buffer zone to alleviate the perverse economic effects of leaders’ frequent turnover, in sustaining long-term local development. Our empirical analyses in Jiangsu province provide evidence that supports this proposition. This study deepens our understanding of the institutional logic underlying China’s economic growth and political stability

Bureaucracy · China · Economic system · Economics · Incentive · Jurisdiction · Market economy · Political economy · Political science · Political stability · Politics · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance · Hong Kong and Taiwan Politics · Local Government Finance and Decentralization