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Coalizer

A coalition tool combining office and policy motivations of political parties

Dados Bibliográficos

ID12972253
AutoresRobin Graichen (0000-0001-7166-2747, Chemnitz University of Technology, autor correspondente), Eric Linhart (0000-0002-1242-5490, Twitter (United States)), Christopher Schuster (0000-0002-0549-3460, Twitter (United States)), Udo Heller (0000-0003-1560-8185, Twitter (United States)), Andréas Müller (0000-0003-1375-6459), Andreas Th Müller (0000-0002-3961-4814, Twitter (United States))
Ano2021
Volume18
Fascículo3
Páginas274-292
Data de publicação2021-01-13
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal of Information Technology & Politics (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 1933-169X • E-ISSN: 1933-1681
EditoraRoutledge (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/19331681.2020.1871150
OpenAlexW3121883361
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas36

While prior work on coalition theories focuses either solely on office or on policy motivations of parties, more elaborate theories combine both types of motivation. Said combination makes them much more appropriate for explaining coalition formation but also more complex. One possibility to make these models broadly applicable are coalition tools. Since existing tools do not incorporate advances from such theories, we present a new coalition tool called Coalizer which takes both office and policy motivations into account and reflects the state of coalition theory. Among others, Coalizer includes features like the computation of policy utility values basing on party positions (supporting different estimation modes), the combination of office and policy utility values, and the indication of utility maximizing strategies for parties. In this paper, we present our coalition tool and illustrate its functionality with the example of the German federal elections in 2017. Coalizer is available online at www.mytuc.org/mcbz

Democracy · German · Multi-party system · Political science · Politics · Public relations · State (computer science · Work (physics · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Engineering · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Transportation Planning and Optimization

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Obras citantes distintas2
Citações por ano0,5
Intervalo de citações2022 - 2025 (4)
Velocidade de citaçãorecent
Altamente citadoNão
Tipos de citaçãoNeutras: 2
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