Political Jurisprudence and the Role of the Supreme Court

Framing the Judicial Power in the Federal Convention of 1787

Dados Bibliográficos

ID13044094
AutoresMatthew S Brogdon (0000-0002-5326-1285, autor correspondente)
Ano2017
Volume6
Fascículo2
Páginas171-200
Data de publicação2017-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessNão
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoAmerican Political Thought (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 2161-1580 • E-ISSN: 2161-1599
EditoraUniversity of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1086/691171
OpenAlexW2606648067
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas1
Referências citadas26

The modern shift toward abstract review and discretionary jurisdiction has heightened perennial controversy over the role of the Supreme Court in constitutional politics. Through close analysis of the framers’ deliberations in the Federal Convention, this article seeks to shed light on that controversy. The institutional logic at work in the debate tasked the Court with settling conflict arising from the federal system and enforcing constitutional limits on the state and federal governments alike. Given that “all interference between the general and local Governments should be obviated as much as possible,” the framers opted to confine that interference to the judicial process. In this legalization of federal conflict, settling constitutional questions was not merely incidental to the process of deciding particular cases, but became an essential function of the Court. In this way, the framers laid the groundwork of modern controversy over the political dimensions of judicial review in the institutional architecture of the Constitution

Constitution · Constitutional review · Convention · Judicial Independence · Judicial review · Jurisdiction · Jurisprudence · Political science · Politics · Supreme court · American Constitutional Law and Politics · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies