How Common Is the East African Community’s Common External Tariff Really? The Influence of Interest Groups on the EAC’s Tariff Negotiations
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 16910444 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Tobias Bünder (0000-0001-7803-4137, Hertie School, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2018 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Fascículo | 1 |
| Data de publicação | 2018-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | SAGE Open (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 2158-2440 • E-ISSN: 2158-2440 |
| Editora | SAGE Publications (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/2158244017748235 |
| OpenAlex | W2785260125 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 4 |
| Referências citadas | 27 |
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda founded a Customs Union in 2004 and apply a Common External Tariff (CET) on imports to the region. However, the CET has been increasingly destabilized by countries using unilateral exemptions on a wide range of strongly traded goods. This instability undermines progress in regional integration and creates an uneven playing field for business. The article discusses evidence for the influence of interest groups on the observed instability. This study takes a political economy perspective and tracks lobbying behavior from the domestic to the regional level. It looks at the influence of business membership organizations and other interest groups on CET negotiations. The article applies an exploratory, qualitative approach predominantly drawing on data gathered by the author in 25 interviews with experts in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in January 2016
Business · Economics · International economics · International trade · Negotiation · Political science · Tariff · Global trade and economics · International Development and Aid · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
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| Obras citantes distintas | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 0,67 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2020 - 2023 (4) |
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 1 |