A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules

Both Kantian and utilitarian theories are in need of further development, and in fact even their strongest advocates now tend to see the theories more as projects in progress than as finished products with every detail engraved in stone. My main concern in this paper is to develop some ideas within the Kantian tradition, without worrying about whether the views presented are orthodox or radically revisionary. More specifically, I sketch some features of a Kantian perspective for reflection on moral rules, contrast this with some other views, and briefly call attention to some problems and strategies for addressing them. My discussion is meant to be suggestive rather than argumentative, for too many details need to be filled in before one can draw more than tentative conclusions about these matters. Such abstract and incomplete reflections are no substitute, of course, for more narrowly focused attention to theoretical and practical issues. But sometimes it is useful to step back from more detailed issues to ask what large projects in moral philosophy seem most worth developing. Since, as most proponents agree, current versions of both Kantian and rule-utilitarian theories need to be further refined, revised, and supplemented, one cannot decide between these approaches by first seeing exactly what they prescribe for particular cases and then comparing these outcomes with intuitive judgments. In this situation, other sorts of comparison become more important. We should consider, for example, the sort of moral reflection each theory recommends, independently of how (or whether) the theories may in the end lead to different judgments about specific cases. My concern here will be with a Kantian normative theory considered at this more abstract level. One should not suppose, however, that at this level moral judgment is unnecessary and we can evaluate competing theories by purely theoretical criteria, such as simplicity, comprehensiveness, and formal elegance. We have relevant moral convictions not only about what it is right to do but also about how we should decide what is right to do

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