Shareability of thought and Frege's constraint

Onofri [Onofri, A. 2018. ‘The Publicity of Thought.’ Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272): 521–541.] proposes an individuation criterion for thoughts that purports to satisfy both shareability (the notion that different thinkers, or a single thinker at different times, can and generally do think type-identical thoughts) and Frege's constraint (according to which two thoughts are different if it is possible for a rational subject to endorse one while rejecting the other). I argue that his proposal fails to satisfy Frege's constraint. Then I propose a modification to Onofri's proposal to fix the problem

Epistemology · Individuation · Linguistics · Political science · Principle of compositionality · Psychoanalysis · Publicity · Sociology · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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