Optimal Voting Rules Under Participation Constraints
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 19081553 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Antonin Macc (autor correspondente), Rafael Treibich (0000-0002-3000-2010) |
| Ano | 2017 |
| Data de publicação | 2017-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | SSRN Electronic Journal (REPOSITORY) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 1556-5068 • E-ISSN: 1556-5068 |
| Editora | RELX Group (Netherlands) (PUBLISHER • NL) |
| DOI | 10.2139/ssrn.3065877 |
| OpenAlex | W2785633761 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 25 |
Business · Cardinal voting systems · Economics · Law and economics · Political science · Politics · Voting · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law
On the Number and Size of Nations
The Elementary Statistics of Majority Voting
On the Economic Success of Gatt/WTO Dispute Settlement
The stability of group formation
Democracy and Proportionality
European apportionment via the Cambridge Compromise
Why not proportional
Minimizing the mean majority deficit
On the Weights of Nations
Get Rid of Unanimity Rule
Optimal Apportionment
On the Democratic Weights of Nations
Standard Voting Power Indexes Do Not Work
Engagement, Disengagement, or Exit
Decision-Rules and Individual Values in Constitutional Choice
II. The Yalta Voting Formula
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |