Equivalent Theories and Ontological Commitment

Dados Bibliográficos

ID19216005
AutoresAude Lebrun (0000-0002-4897-5611, California Polytechnic State University, autor correspondente)
Ano2026
Volume93
Fascículo3
Páginas1-20
Data de publicação2026-01-13
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoPhilosophy of Science (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0031-8248 • E-ISSN: 1539-767X
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/psa.2025.10190
OpenAlexW7123358667
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas48

The literature on theoretical equivalence in the philosophy of physics is replete with physical theories that look quite different but are purportedly equivalent. Plausibly, there might exist a pair of equivalent theories that look different insofar as they existentially quantify over different entities. However, given the preeminence of the quantificational theory of ontological commitment, which tells us to look to quantified entities to inform ontology, such a pair of theories seems to be a problem. In this article, I argue that there is no good way out of the problem, and I reject the quantificational theory of ontological commitment

Equivalence (formal languages) · Ontology · Philosophy of science · Physicalism · Semantics (computer science) · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Quantum Mechanics and Applications