Military Policy and Strategy in the Gulf War

One reason military operations go awry on the battlefield is that political objectives, security policies, and military strategy often are not compatible. Before any nation resorts to the use of force to secure its national interest, the politician and the general must together insure that the military means are consistent with the political objectives. If political objectives, security policies, and military strategy are ambiguous or improperly integrated, failure on the battlefield is certain. For a political leader, there maybe some virtue in ambiguity in dealing with he enemy; there may even be some virtue in ambiguity in relations with an ally. But ambiguity can have no virtue when he sits down together with his own strategists. The Gulf War may prove to be a classic case of such crippling ambiguity. The most formidable strategic problem for Saddam Hussein before undertaking the Gulf War was to insure that Iraq's political objectives, security policies, and military strategy were clearly defined and congruous. Had he properly evaluated the conflicting demands that his political objectives and security policies placed upon his strategic concept, he might have been able to devise a war-winning strategy at a price he was willing to pay. More likely, he would have abandoned the entire enterprise. Since he did not, what started out as Saddam's Qadisiya may yet prove to be his Waterloo

Economic history · Economics · Gulf war · Military science · Military strategy · Political economy · Political science · Anthropology: Ethics, History, Culture · History · Intelligence, Security, War Strategy · Law · Military and Defense Studies

• The lessons of recent wars

  Robert E Harkavy•Third World Quarterly•1984

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