Conceptualism and Concept Acquisition

Many think that the perceptual theory known as “conceptualism” cannot honour a common and intuitive constraint on concept acquisition – that we gain the initial power to deploy primitive concepts through experience. Their argument is: if experience involves the deployment of concepts, then one must possess the power to deploy those concepts prior to experience. I argue that the plausibility of this argument rests on a subtle equivocation. It is true that conceptualism requires a particular kind of power to deploy concepts prior to experience, but not the sort referenced in the intuitive constraint mentioned above. I end by proposing how the conceptualist might satisfy this constraint. I conclude that conceptualism is better situated to account for primitive concept acquisition than typically thought

Argument (complex analysis) · Cognitive science · Conceptualism · Constraint (computer-aided design) · Epistemology · Situated · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

• Reference and Consciousness

  John Campbell•Reference and Consciousness…•2002

  Incluir item

• An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense

  Thomas Reid, Derek R Brookes et al.•An Inquiry into the Human Mind on…•1997

  Incluir item

• Perception and its Objects

  B Brewer•Perception and Its objects•2011

  Incluir item

• Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?

  Christopher Peacocke•The Journal of Philosophy•2001

  Incluir item

• Sense and Content

  Kim Sterelny, Christopher Peacocke•The Philosophical Review•1987

  Incluir item

• Nonconceptual Content and the “Space of Reasons”

  Richard G Heck•The Philosophical Review•2000

  Incluir item

• An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

  J E Creighton, John Locke et al.•The Philosophical Review•1894

  Incluir item

• Is There a Problem about Nonconceptual Content

  Jeff Speaks•The Philosophical Review•2005

  Incluir item

• A New Argument for Nonconceptual Content

  Open Access•Adina L Roskies•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2008

  Incluir item

• Epiphenomenal Qualia

  Frank Jackson•The Philosophical Quarterly•1982

  Incluir item