Sources of hyperintensionality

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20142940
AutoresGiorgio Lenta (0000-0002-5229-101X, Università degli Studi di Genova Genova Italy, autor correspondente)
Ano2023
Volume89
Fascículo6
Páginas811-822
Data de publicação2023-12-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12497
OpenAlexW4387899257
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas10

A wide variety of concepts are nowadays considered to be hyperintensional, and some of them do not seem to involve our representational attitudes. This led some philosophers to identify and defend a notion of worldly hyperintensionality: the idea that some hyperintensional phenomena derive from features of objective reality, independently of how we represent it. Against this view, Darragh Byrne and Naomi Thompson argue that the correct understanding of such phenomena must be conceptualist in nature, and claim that hyperintensionality always derives from features of representations. In the present work I defend the genuine distinction between worldly and representational hyperintensionality through a new framing of the issue: the comparison with worldly intensionality. I argue that locating the sources of hyperintensionality should not be affected by preferences towards any specific semantic framework, and reject Byrne and Thompson's argument against worldly hyperintensionality

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Framing (construction) · Sociology · Variety (cybernetics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science