Against Deductive Closure

The present article illustrates a conflict between the claim that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences, and a very inclusive claim about the factors that are sufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions. Inasmuch as it is implausible to hold that the factors listed here are insufficient to determine whether it is rational to believe respective propositions, we have good reason to deny that rational belief sets are closed under deductive consequences

Closure (psychology) · Deductive reasoning · Epistemology · Political science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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