Relational Objectivity

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20142965
AutoresNicholas Sars (0000-0003-4910-8365, Department of Philosophy & World Religions, Wilson Ethics Fellow University of Northern Iowa Cedar Falls Iowa USA, autor correspondente)
Ano2025
Volume91
Fascículo3
Data de publicação2025-06-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/theo.12597
OpenAlexW4408328598
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas23

In ‘Freedom and Resentment’, Peter Strawson presents a compelling dichotomy between a ‘participant stance’ and an ‘objective stance’ that has been influential in a variety of contemporary discussions. Commentators have tended to understand Strawson's overall argument in terms of a stark opposition between these stances; however, doing so hides the possibility of multiple senses of objectivity. This paper argues that an expanded understanding of the ‘objective stance’ can increase the appeal of a broadly Strawsonian moral psychology and uses Kate Manne's recent approach to misogyny to support the proposed revision. Additionally, the paper shows that grounds for such an expanded understanding can be found within Strawson's own work and that a revised Strawsonian moral psychology need not undermine the widespread influence of Strawson's project in ‘Freedom and Resentment’

Epistemology · Objectivity (philosophy) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy