Against Rawlsian Political Autonomy
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 20143033 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Akihiro Inoue (0000-0002-7454-7880, Professor of Political Philosophy, Department of Advanced Social and International Studies Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo Tokyo Japan, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2026 |
| Volume | 92 |
| Fascículo | 2 |
| Data de publicação | 2026-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Editora | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.70069 |
| OpenAlex | W7128296026 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 26 |
According to the idea of public reason, fundamental political questions should be resolved solely on the basis of considerations that all citizens can reasonably accept. While various rationales—such as the ideal of civic friendship—have been offered in support of public reason, most arguments assume ideal, well‐ordered conditions. Yet many real‐world societies are far from ideal, often dominated by unreasonable persons—sometimes even those in power. Emil Andersson addresses the question of how familiar rationales for public reason fare under such conditions. More specifically, he argues that the political community view—which grounds public reason in the ideal of civic friendship—faces serious challenges in non‐well‐ordered, asymmetrically divided contexts characterised by large numbers of unreasonable people. In this paper, I show that, while Andersson's critique of the political community view of public reason is on target, his argument against the most plausible construal of this view—namely the inclusive political community view—is unsuccessful, because the value of inclusion can be understood as carrying sufficient weight even in non‐well‐ordered contexts. I then argue that Andersson's alternative conception—namely Rawlsian political autonomy—does not convincingly address the rationale for, or the applicability of, public reason in non‐well‐ordered societies, especially when compared to the inclusive political community view
Argument (complex analysis) · Autonomy · Classical liberalism · Ideal (ethics) · Politics · Public choice · Public reason · Value (mathematics) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics
Religion and Public Reasons
Utopophobia
On the Idea of Public Reason
Political Liberalism and Political Community
Public Reason and Political Autonomy
Autonomy, Community, and the Justification of Public Reason
Respect, Recognition, and Public Reason
Can Rawlsian Containment of Hateful Viewpoints Be Effective
Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship
The Moral Basis of Political Liberalism
Under Pressure
When God Commands Disobedience
The Rights of Unreasonable Citizens
Noncompliance and the Demands of Public Reason
The Moral Status of Public Reason
The reasons of the unreasonable
Does political community require public reason? On Lister’s defence of political liberalism
Cambridge Rawls Lexicon
Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism
Civic Friendship, Public Reason
The place of unreasonable people beyond Rawls
A framework for analyzing public reason theories
The Beginning of Community
Can Civic Friendship Ground Public Reason
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |