The Context Principle and Dummett's Argument for Anti-realism

Dados Bibliográficos

ID20143073
AutoresKaren Green (0000-0001-7570-3577)
Ano2008
Volume71
Fascículo2
Páginas92-117
Data de publicação2008-02-11
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoTheoria (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.2005.tb01009.x
OpenAlexW2142429766
IdiomaEN
Referências citadas22

In his earlier writings, Dummett made a distinction between deep and shallow arguments for being suspicious of bivalence. Deep arguments brought with them a commitment to anti-realism, shallow arguments did not. This distinction was motivated by a certain understanding of the significance of the context principle, according to which it is the sentence which is the primary vehicle of meaning. In later writings Dummett has despaired of making clear the distinction between deep and shallow arguments for rejecting bivalence. He has adopted the position that all deviations from bivalence involve anti-realism of some kind. In this paper I argue that this in effect removes any clear connection between Dummettian anti-realism and idealism. A suspicion of bivalence should often be interpreted as the result of an anti-realim of the error theoretic kind

Argument (complex analysis) · Context (archaeology) · Epistemology · Idealism · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Realism · Sentence · Classical Philosophy and Thought · History · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science